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Abstract
Does cultural evolution happen by a process of copying or replication? And how 
exactly does cultural transmission compare with that paradigmatic case of replica-
tion, the copying of DNA in living cells? Theorists of cultural evolution are divided 
on these issues. The most important objection to the replication model has been lev-
eled by Dan Sperber and his colleagues. Cultural transmission, they argue, is almost 
always reconstructive and transformative, while strict ‘replication’ can be seen as 
a rare limiting case at most. By means of some thought experiments and intuition 
pumps, I clear up some confusion about what qualifies as ‘replication’. I propose 
a distinction between evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying 
these concepts at different levels of resolution. I defend a purely abstract and infor-
mation-theoretical definition of replication, while rejecting more material concep-
tions. In the end, even after taking Sperber’s valuable and important points on board, 
the notion of cultural replication remains a valid and useful one. This is fortunate, 
because we need it for certain explanatory projects (e.g., understanding cumulative 
cultural adaptations).
Keywords Cultural evolution · Replication · Information · Granularity · Extraction 
and evocation · Memes
Introduction
Many discussions in the burgeoning field of cultural evolution still revolve—in 
one way or another—around the scope and limitations of the analogy with bio-
logical evolution (Lewens 2015; Mesoudi 2011; Buskes 2013; Claidière et  al. 
2014; Mesoudi et  al. 2006). How Darwinian is cultural evolution exactly? Is it 
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cumulative, as in the biological realm? Is it blind or guided? Does the phenotype/
genotype distinction hold in the cultural domain? What, if anything, is the cul-
tural equivalent of a ‘mutation’? Perhaps one of the most contentious points of 
comparison is this: Does cultural evolution happen through a process of replica-
tion (or copying/imitation)? Most famously, the notion of replication is associated 
with ‘memes’, the cultural counterpart of genes proposed by Richard Dawkins in 
The Selfish Gene (1976). According to Dawkins and others, memes play the role 
of the replicator in the cultural realm, analogous to genes in the biological realm 
(Blackmore 2000; Dennett 1995, 2017).
Many authors have disputed the usefulness of ‘replicators’ and replication in 
the cultural domain. Jablonka and Lamb (2014) have argued that the concept of 
cultural replicators ignores the role of learning and developmental construction. 
Others reject the idea that culture can be broken down into discrete, gene-like 
units (Bloch 2000; Mesoudi 2011), or object that there is no cultural analogue for 
genetic codes and DNA replication machinery (Lewens 2015; Acerbi and Mes-
oudi 2015). Henrich and his colleagues, for their part, have argued that the whole 
issue of ‘replication’ is a distraction, as cumulative cultural evolution works per-
fectly well without discrete, gene-like replicators (Henrich et  al. 2008; see also 
Nanay 2011). One of the most forceful objections against the replication model of 
culture has come from Dan Sperber. For many years, Sperber and his colleagues 
have argued that culture does not evolve by straightforward replication, despite 
what the superficial analogy between genes and memes might suggest (Atran 
2001; Boyer 1994; Claidière et al. 2014; Heintz and Claidière 2015; Scott-Phil-
lips 2015; Sperber 1996, 2000). In the cultural realm, replication is a limiting 
case at best, applicable to only a few isolated phenomena. In all other cases, cul-
tural transmission involves heavy doses of transformation and reconstruction on 
the basis of prior knowledge. This poses a serious problem for memes. Accord-
ing to Lewens (2015, p. 27) and many others, the memetic approach to culture 
is committed to “a strict process of replication”, and is therefore immediately 
ruled out as a serious contender for studying culture. But Sperber’s objections 
to memes may have wider consequences. Some approaches in cultural evolution 
may well disavow meme-talk, but they still rely on a conception of culture as 
consisting of discrete units that undergo a process of reproduction and selection 
(e.g., Hull 1990; O’Brien et al. 2010). Thus, they may also fall prey to Sperber’s 
objection (for a discussion of memetic versus selectionist approaches, see Lewens 
2015, Sect. 4.1).
In this paper, I develop a conceptual analysis of the term “replication” in both 
the cultural and the biological realm, defending a purely abstract and informa-
tion-theoretical approach. In order to understand the sense in which genes can be 
treated as ‘replicators’, we have to think of them in terms of abstract mathemati-
cal information, rather than physical substrates. Once we adopt this definition and 
extrapolate it to culture, some important objections against cultural “replication” 
evaporate. By means of some thought experiments, I make a distinction between 
evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying these concepts at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction.
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Amusing mathematicians
A group of mathematicians like to tell jokes to enliven their conference dinners. 
Because they have known each other for such a long time, and being avid humor-
ists, they decide to design a more efficient system for their amusement. They assign 
numbers to each joke in their repertoire, so that they can save time and just call out 
that number. So the next night at a conference dinner, the first mathematician shouts 
out: “56!” Boisterous laughter from around the table. The second mathematician has 
a go: “532!” Everyone cracks up again. A third mathematician shouts “345!” Just a 
few chuckles and groans, with the exception of one young mathematician, who is 
rolling over the floor laughing. The third joke-teller turns over to the rookie and asks 
him: “So at least one of you folks liked my last joke, right?” The young one snick-
ers: “It’s just that I had never heard that one before!”
I am not sure where this joke originated, but for all I know it could have been 
dreamt up by Dan Sperber or one of his collaborators, because it nicely illustrates 
an important insight of theirs about cultural evolution.1 Many models of cultural 
evolution assume more or less by default that, whenever we see chains of identical 
or similar representations in a cultural environment, some sort of replication must 
be going on. But the joke about the mathematicians shows why this assumption is 
wrongheaded. Their system of amusement is not based on straightforward replica-
tion. The joke teller does not transmit a full-blown joke, but just selects one from the 
repertoire and calls out its number, thus bringing about a similar representation in 
the minds of the receivers. The process does look like replication, however, because 
there is a causal arrow going from sender to receiver, supported by the usual coun-
terfactuals. For example, if you mishear the number being called out, you will end 
up with a different mental representation. But the numbers themselves are not funny. 
They provoke laughter only because they elicit some previously stored, fully formed 
semantic content. For the system to work, every participant already needs all the 
jokes stored in memory, along with the corresponding numbers.2 This, of course, 
is the point of the punch line: if you start laughing, you must have heard the joke 
before.
Sperber himself illustrates the point with a different thought experiment. Imagine 
you see a sequence of tape recorders: the first recorder plays a song, then stops. A 
few seconds later the second recorder in line starts playing the same song. When 
it has finished, the third sets in, and so forth. If you witness this string of events, 
you may reasonably infer that the devices are recording and then replaying a song. 
In other words, there seems to be a process of replication going on. But then it is 
revealed that the sound-recorders already have a repertoire of songs stored in mem-
ory, and they have merely been “activated by the sound of the last five bars of any 
melody in their repertoire” (Sperber 2000, p. 169). After the first recorder stops 
playing, the second recorder identifies the song and retrieves it from its internal 
1 As I will discuss later on, however, the joke already appears in a 1958 satirical novel by Peter de Vries.
2 They don’t need to be memorized: We could imagine that all the mathematicians have been given a 
sheet of paper with numbered jokes, and that they are just looking up the jokes in the list.
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memory. No replication is taking place, even though a naive observer might be for-
given for thinking so. Returning to human beings, we could imagine—ruining our 
punchline—that people are born with an innate repertoire of jokes, each of which 
can be triggered by a certain stimulus (hearing a call-out number). In this way, we 
can imagine a Chinese whisper chain of people amusing each other with jokes, even 
though no transmission is going on (or hardly any).
It goes without saying that Sperber and his colleagues are not suggesting that 
humans are born with an innate repertoire of jokes, or, for that matter, with any 
other complex representations. But still, this is a useful limiting case to think about 
cultural transmission. In general terms, Sperber proposes three “minimal conditions 
for true replication”. For B to be a copy of A,
1. B must be caused by A (together with background conditions)
2. B must be similar in relevant respects to A
3. The process that generates B must obtain the information that 
makes B similar to A from A. (Sperber 2000, p. 169)
The third condition is the crucial one, and is generally not fulfilled in the cultural 
domain, and certainly not in our scenario about the mathematicians. In a typical act 
of communication or social learning, people do not copy representations directly, 
but “reconstruct” them on the basis of knowledge they already possess, whether that 
knowledge is innate, has been acquired earlier, or is embodied in the environment: 
“information provided by the stimulus is complemented with information already 
available in the system” (Sperber 2000, p. 171). Although Sperber does not define 
his notion of “information”, I think his discussion of triggering makes most sense 
in the context of the mathematical definition of ‘information’ (Shannon 1948/2001), 
and I will rely on this definition to develop my own distinction between evocation 
and extraction (see below).3 In this mathematical sense, information, roughly speak-
ing, can be seen as a measure of surprise. For instance, in the case of Sperber’s trig-
gered tape recorders, the ‘receiver’ already has the full song stored in memory, so 
the message is not ‘surprising’, containing no information. Similarly, if you listen to 
a joke you have heard before, the message carries no new information (for you). But 
a novel joke has the ability to surprise you, because it does contain new information 
(for you).
In any event, without the availability of some prior knowledge, cultural transmis-
sion could not succeed in the first place. Public expressions or displays of culture 
almost always underdetermine the representation being transmitted. In the extreme 
case of the mathematicians, an observer can immediately see this, even without 
3 The mathematical theory of information expressly leaves out any mention of semantics, because, 
according to Shannon, this was “irrelevant to the engineering problem”. Shannon’s definition is a way 
to measure the amount of information, but it tells us nothing about what this information is about. It 
is unclear exactly how the mathematical definition relates to our everyday understanding of (semantic) 
information (Wilkins and Hull 2001; Dennett 2017, chapter 6), and this remains an outstanding problem 
in the philosophy of information. For a recent ambitious attempt to bridge the gap from mathematics to 
semantics, see Haig (2017).
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knowing the details of their communication system. A three-digit number cannot 
store all the semantic content that goes into a joke. If the mathematicians end up 
laughing in concert (presumably entertained by the same joke), that must be because 
the semantic content in question was already available to them prior to the calling-
out. Even when a joke is spelled out in the ordinary way, however, successful trans-
mission depends on substantial prior knowledge on the part of the listeners: mastery 
of the language in which the joke is related (vocabulary, pronunciation, grammar), 
but also folk psychological knowledge, familiarity with the conventions of joke-
telling, and perhaps also background knowledge about politics, social stereotypes, 
or sex. In a successful recounting of a joke, the utterances of the joke-teller should 
provide enough clues (but not too many) for the audience to reconstruct the intended 
meaning and ‘get’ the punchline.
If we are trying to explain the existence of stable cultural traditions through time, 
we therefore have to take into account the contributions made by evoked informa-
tion as well as transmitted information. For instance, some representations achieve 
wide dissemination mainly by virtue of certain universal cognitive predispositions 
and biases. In the cultural selection tournament, some representations will therefore 
be more salient, memorable, and inferentially rich to the human mind than others. In 
Sperber’s framework, “cultural attractors” are locations in the space of possible rep-
resentations that are maximally relevant, from a cognitive point of view. In a cultural 
population, shared representations will gravitate towards those attractors: “to some 
extent all humans, and to a greater extent all members of the same population at any 
one time, are attracted in the same direction” (Sperber 1996, p. 118). In his book on 
cultural traditions, Morin (2015) has proposed a spectrum between “evoked” and 
“transmitted” culture. If the mathematicians in our joke were to play a game of Chi-
nese whispers, making use of their coding system, the stability of the transmission 
chain would be mostly a function of evocation, not transmission. We would find our-
selves at the ‘evoked’ end of Morin’s spectrum, just like in the case of the sound 
recorders in Sperber’s thought experiment. Other cultural traditions may be closer to 
the “transmitted” end of the spectrum, but probably no cultural traditions can persist 
without at least some element of evocation.
Reconstructing and decoding
Sperber and his colleagues are completely right to call our attention to the role of 
evocation and reconstruction in cultural traditions. If we see a chain of similar and 
causally connected representations, we should not assume by default that some pro-
cess of straightforward replication is going on. In Sperber’s words, cultural theorists 
should not “take for granted that the co-occurrence of causation and of similarity 
between cause and effect is sufficient evidence of inheritance” (Sperber 2000, p. 
169). Apart from this conceptual point, I also grant that Sperber is probably right 
about the empirical facts. In human culture, virtually every form of cultural trans-
mission involves at least some element of evocation. The respective contributions of 
transmission and evocation may differ, but the stability of cultural traditions is never 
exhaustively explained by transmission alone.
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Now let me proceed to the areas of disagreement. Imagine that our mathemati-
cians have devised a slightly different way of telling jokes. Suppose they are particu-
larly fond of dirty jokes, but they prefer not to be overheard by certain colleagues 
with more delicate sensibilities. Rather than assigning numbers to a fixed inventory 
of jokes, they have devised a numerical code. Each number that is called out cor-
responds to a specific joke, as before, but this time the code is generative. Novel as 
well as old jokes can be encrypted. Now suppose that we have a transmission chain 
of mathematicians, like in the Chinese whisper game. Each mathematician commu-
nicates a certain number to his neighbor, who then reconstructs the semantic con-
tent, and proceeds to ‘tell’ the same joke to the next one in line.
In many respects, the new scenario resembles the original. A joke-teller utters 
a number, the receiver ‘gets’ the joke and cracks up. In both cases, a listener can-
not appreciate the jokes without prior possession of substantial knowledge. If you 
don’t know either the code or the inventory, you will not end up with the original 
representation in your mind, and communication will fail. Despite appearances, no 
straightforward copying is taking place, but rather a complicated process of recon-
struction on the basis of prior knowledge.
In some crucial respects, however, our new situation is clearly different from the 
first. Even though the jokes are being reconstructed on the basis of prior knowledge, 
as in the first scenario, this time it is perfectly possible that some mathematician lis-
tening to the encrypted joke had indeed ‘never heard it before’. I propose that we can 
treat the second system of communication, unlike the first, as a form of replication, 
despite the fact that it relies on heavy doses of reconstruction, and does not involve 
a straightforward copying mechanism. The main motivation behind this proposal is 
pragmatic. If we are studying the dissemination of a particular joke in a population 
of mathematicians, it does not really matter exactly how ‘replication’ is achieved. 
Whether the joke-tellers are spelling out the jokes in the usual way, or using some 
sort of elaborate code, we will observe the same processes of dissemination, muta-
tion, cultural attraction, and branching of lineages. As long as the encryption sys-
tem is faithful and reliable, we can stand back and abstract away from the precise 
copying mechanism. Notice that we can not afford to do that with Sperber’s sound 
recorders, or with the first scenario involving the mathematicians. If we black-box 
the machines and treat them as replication devices, then our explanatory projects are 
bound to go awry. For instance, a theorist black-boxing the sound recorders might 
be led to the prediction that mutations and noise in the “transmission” chain will 
accumulate over time, and lineages will start to evolve. But this would be factually 
wrong: the sound-recorders will keep playing the same song over and over again. 
There might be noise or glitches in each performance, but those will not accumulate.
As a real-life example of the second scenario, consider the famous Enigma code 
employed by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Enigma encryption was 
carried out by an electro-mechanical cipher machine, and was based on a substitu-
tion scheme for each letter in a given message. It was also coordinated by an elabo-
rate system of constantly changing routines. In order to extract the intended mes-
sage on the receiving end, substantial prior ‘knowledge’ was required. First of all, 
the receiver needs to have another Enigma machine to decipher the message, but 
she also needs to know the exact instructions for setting it up, as well as the daily 
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changing coding routines. Because the British intelligence agencies intercepting the 
German messages lacked such prior knowledge, they could not decipher them.
Does the Enigma system for communication qualify as a form of replication? In 
many respects, Enigma communication is behaviorally indistinguishable from ‘true’ 
replication (however defined), as indeed it was designed to be by the German cryp-
tographers who created it. In the interest of military victory, the message coming 
out at the receiving end (e.g., plans for military maneuvers) had indeed better be an 
exact copy of the original. For a military historian interested in cultural transmission 
chains, it would have made no difference if the Germans had used a difference sys-
tem of communication, or indeed if they had relayed uncoded messages (though of 
course that would have been strategic suicide).
If all these examples can be regarded as “replication”, as I propose, then it seems 
that replication turns out to be perfectly compatible with heavy reconstruction on the 
basis of prior knowledge. Even though the information of the stimulus is “comple-
mented with information already available in the system”, in Sperber’s words, and 
even though the transmission chain would break down completely in the absence of 
such prior information, both scenarios still fulfill Sperber’s third minimal condition 
of replication: “The process that generates B must obtain the information that makes 
B similar to A from A.” (Sperber 2000, p. 169). It seems that Sperber is too demand-
ing about what constitutes proper replication, a point that was also made by Lew-
ens (2015, p. 28). For Lewens, we can talk about replication in the cultural domain 
as soon as “a given idea [is] causally responsible for the structure of a resembling 
daughter idea”.4 Because Sperber’s concept of “reconstruction” is ambiguous in 
this regard, I propose instead to distinguish between evocation and extraction. In a 
case of evocation, the final representation is already available to the receiver and is 
merely being triggered by some simple stimulus.5 No transmission is taking place 
(except for the trigger), and thus no replication is happening. In the case of extrac-
tion, by contrast, prior knowledge on the part of the receiver serves to recreate or 
decode the transmitted representation, not to evoke some previously stored repre-
sentation. In the case of extraction, the message itself is novel and surprising to the 
receiver, even though the transmission process is elaborate and indirect. (Below, I 
apply these concepts to different levels of abstraction.)
4 If Lewens wants to maintain this relaxed notion of “replication” throughout, however, it is hard to see 
why he still dismisses memes, which clearly fulfill his definition. A meme gets ‘replicated’ when it is 
causally responsible for the occurrence of another cultural representation that is sufficiently similar to be 
treated as an instantiation of the same ‘meme’.
5 Defined in this way, “evocation” should be distinguished from Tooby and Cosmides’ concept of 
“evoked culture” (Tooby and Cosmides 1994), which more narrowly refers to the role of innate cogni-
tive mechanisms in bringing about cultural representations. My concept of “evocation” is broader. As the 
example of the mathematicians shows, information that is “evoked” need not be innate. It is possible that 
it was simply acquired or transmitted at an earlier point.
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Information and redundancy demons
My proposal relies on an abstract and information-theoretical conception of cultural 
representations. In the second scenario of the mathematicians, but not the first, there 
is a significant transfer of information, in line with Shannon’s (1948/2001) concep-
tion of information as a reduction of uncertainty. The extracted semantic content is 
‘surprising’ to the receiver, assuming he has not heard the joke before. In the first 
scenario, by contrast, there is hardly any reduction of uncertainty, except for the 
few bits of information involved in the current choice from the repertoire. This, of 
course, will be reflected by the length of the called-out numbers. In the original situ-
ation, the listener only needs a few bits to “reconstruct” the semantic content of the 
joke. In the second scenario, however, the numbers need to be significantly longer, 
as each individual word in the joke needs to be conveyed.
Some cultural theorists resist this purely abstract approach to cultural repre-
sentations in terms of information. Rather than identifying cultural representation 
with information, they are looking for some sort of physical entity or structure that 
is being copied, such as brain states, behaviors, tools, sound waves, etc. (Aunger 
2002). Many of them see DNA replication as a paradigm case of ‘proper’ replica-
tion, because this process at least involves an identifiable and straightforward causal 
mechanism. Consequently, when they are talking about ‘replication’, they are think-
ing of some sort of straightforward physical mechanism for duplicating a physical 
object, structure, or pattern. Other theorists seem to endorse the information-theo-
retical conception of culture, but fail to maintain this perspective throughout, and 
sometimes (covertly) fall back on a more material conception. In his insightful book 
on cultural transmission, for example, Morin writes: “Can traditions be identified 
with the information that is passed on when they are transmitted? No, not always. 
Just because cultural transmission involves an exchange of ideas does not mean that 
traditions themselves are the ideas that their proliferation relies on.” (Morin 2015, 
p. 49, italics in original). But it seems that Morin is sliding from “information” to 
“conceptual idea” here, as is also visible a few pages earlier when he rejects the 
default conception that “culture is a set of socially transmitted representations (or 
bits of information)” (2015, p. 47). Morin is right that culture does not merely con-
sist of ideas (mental representations), but also physical artefacts, behaviours and 
perceptual patterns (e.g., sound waves). But this does not compromise the informa-
tional conception of culture. Physical artefacts instantiate information no less than 
neural structures. Defenders of the informational view argue that, in all these cases, 
it is useful to equate culture with the information instantiated by the material carrier, 
rather than with the material carrier itself.6
6 Consistent with his more material approach, Morin has also rejected the “reduction of genes to infor-
mation” (personal communication, 2017). If genes are mere information, asks Morin, does it follow that 
we  can send our genome through the internet? Yes. According to a strictly informational conception, 
“genes” can indeed be saved on a flash disk or e-mailed (see Dennett 2011). For Morin, this is a reductio 
ad absurdum of the strictly informational point of view, but I in fact welcome the conclusion. The infor-
mational view also works both ways: Researchers have recently succeeded in encoding a digitized video 
clip into the DNA of a bacterium (Shipman et al. 2017).
1 3
Replicate after reading: on the extraction and evocation of… Page 9 of 18  27 
Take the paradigm case of replication, DNA copying. As George Williams and 
others have argued, genes should not be identified with physical molecules, but 
rather with the information residing in those molecules (Williams 1992; Durham 
1991; Haig 2007). It is tempting to think that the entity being copied is the physi-
cal DNA molecule itself. DNA, after all, is a discrete and visible physical entity. 
But on the informational approach, the only thing that matters is that some piece of 
abstract information (a digital sequence) is recreated in a different physical environ-
ment. Even though the mechanism responsible for replication of genes is relatively 
straightforward and simple, this is not a necessary requirement to justify talk about 
‘replication’.
A thought experiment will help to show this. Imagine that the replication of 
genetic information in our bodies is carried out by a cohort of tiny agents. Let’s 
call them Redundancy Demons. During cell division, the demons unwind a DNA 
strand, communicate the sequence to each other, and then re-assemble a comple-
ment DNA string base by base (think of plastic toy models of DNA used for edu-
cational purposes). The Redundancy Demons are extremely diligent and achieve 
almost perfect fidelity, just as in the actual world we live in. Does this qualify as 
replication? Ex hypothesi, the demons’ labor would be indistinguishable from “true” 
replication. It is logically possible that such demons are at work as we speak, just as 
some ‘sophisticated’ theologians have suggested that God is secretly fiddling with 
our DNA, all the while making sure that He stays below the threshold of statistical 
detectability (Haught 2000; Miller 2000).  And we could easily make our thought 
experiment more fanciful, without changing the basic point. Even if it were dis-
covered that Redundancy Demons use a range of different molecules for encrypt-
ing the genetic information, rather than the four known nucleobases in DNA strings 
(ACGT), that would not make any difference in practice, as long as the information 
is still somehow transcribed to the right amino acid sequences. And what if they 
used tiny Enigma machines for secrecy, decoding the information in each transmis-
sion event? None of this would make a difference from the informational point of 
view, and none of it would compromise the evolutionary algorithm of variation and 
selection. To all intents and purposes, what is going on would still be “replication”.
Level of resolution
What are the Redundancy Demons copying? Information of course, just like natural 
DNA copying mechanisms in the real world. But information is not a given in the 
world. It needs to be identified, and this can happen at different levels of resolution. 
Even in this paradigm case of replication, we need to settle on the right level of 
analysis to identify the information being replicated. If we observe, after the com-
pletion of regular (mitotic) cell division, that the two chromosomes in either cell 
are “replicas” of one another, this should not be taken to imply that they are exactly 
alike. In fact, there will be plenty of differences between them: they are wound up 
and folded in a different way, they have a different spatial orientation, and their mol-
ecules are arranged in countless different ways. Two chromosomes are only “repli-
cas” of each other to the extent that both can be seen as embodying a certain amount 
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of abstract information in the way their base pairs are arranged along their double 
helix, abstracting away from everything else. There is much more “information” in 
a chromosome than the small portion residing in the one-dimensional arrangement 
of their base pairs, but that information is not preserved during cell division, so we 
ignore it. It is a difference that doesn’t make a difference (Dennett 2017).
Now let’s apply these same points to the cultural realm. If you identify cultural 
representations with some sort of physical substrate, you will look in vain for some 
identifiable replication mechanism that makes copies of those material entities, 
in the way that DNA strands unwind and assemble a replica. But on an informa-
tional approach, this is not necessary. What matters is that some piece of informa-
tion is somehow transmitted from one physical carrier to the next, no matter how 
roundabout and circuitous the mechanism, and no matter how different the physical 
carriers.
Here as elsewhere, information can be found at different levels of resolution 
(Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015). For instance, when we say, upon being told a joke, that 
we have heard “it” before, we have implicitly adopted a certain level of resolution 
in our analysis. We are not talking about the specific wording, or acoustic qualities, 
or even the language the joke was spoken in. We recognize two representations as 
instantiating the same joke in virtue of some higher-level semantic similarities. If 
we want to amuse a friend with a joke we heard earlier, we are not interested in 
‘replicating’ the exact wording. Rather, we tell the story in our own words. At the 
highest level of abstraction, even if two jokes have a different storyline, we may still 
identify them as being the same one, provided they have a similar set-up and achieve 
a similar comic effect. Peter De Vries’ satirical novel The Mackerel Plaza contains 
a version of our mathematicians joke which is set in a prison, with inmates rather 
than mathematicians. At the end of the joke, after a very similar set-up, a newbie 
tries to call out a number from his cell, but is met with dead silence. “The newcomer 
asked his cell partner, a seasoned inmate who had just got through explaining the 
system to him, ‘What’s the matter? Isn’t that a good story?’ ‘Oh, sure,’ the cellmate 
answered, ‘but he don’t tell it right.’” (De Vries 1958, loc. 551) When I read this 
joke, I immediately recognized it as basically the “same” joke as the one I heard 
before about the mathematicians. But that relation of identity is only situated at the 
highest possible level of abstraction.
This is the context of our everyday understanding of jokes, but we can imagine 
other contexts. Each physical copy of The Mackerel Plaza contains an exact word-
for-word copy of the joke about the inmates and their numbered jokes (as does the 
e-book version I own). The book itself abstracts away from the verbal delivery of the 
joke (even though that, coincidentally, provides the very punchline). If The Mackerel 
Plaza is ever made into a stage play, then the actor playing the Reverend Mackerel 
may want to give an exact word-for-word verbal delivery. If professional comedi-
ans learn jokes from each other, they may pay attention to nuances of intonation, 
phrasing and delivery, but abstract away from exact wording. An even higher level 
of resolution is the Aristocrats joke, a notorious off-color comedy routine which 
is more of an abstract template for telling a joke, but which is instantly recogniz-
able to people who are familiar with it, and which has been performed by countless 
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comedians.7 Moving to lower levels of resolution, mnemonists like the famous Solo-
mon Shereshevsky are capable of repeating several pages of text verbatim after hav-
ing heard the words only once, although such people have difficulties extracting the 
gist of the story and relating it in their own words. If someone like Shereshevsky is 
asked to recount a joke he has heard from someone else, he will be able to ‘repli-
cate’ at the level of individual words and phrases, but unable to replicate at the level 
of resolution that most of us focus on. And of course we can make a sound record-
ing of a specific delivery of a joke, which replicates the jokes at an ever more fine-
grained level.
Replicate after reading
If we now (1) adopt an abstract definition of cultural  information and (2) distin-
guish between different levels of abstraction, we can resolve the issue of evocation 
vs. extraction in the cultural realm. In several publications, Sperber has argued that 
replication in the cultural domain, though not strictly impossible, should be seen 
as a limiting case of the more general mechanism of cultural attraction: “there are 
cases of actual memes, though much fewer than is often thought. Chain-letters, for 
instance, fit the definition” (Sperber 2000, p. 163).
We agree that chain letters can be treated as ‘memes’ that replicate in a cul-
tural environment. But in virtue of what do we treat one chain letter as a replica of 
another, as an instantiation of the same ‘meme’? Two token letters of the same type 
can be different in numerous ways. In everyday talk about chain letters, we abstract 
away from things such as ink type, font, letter spacing and paper quality. In some 
contexts, we can move up to a higher level of abstraction still: If I translate a chain 
letter into a different language, or rephrase it in my own wording, we would still 
arguably call it the ‘same’ chain letter (for instance, because it threatens the reader 
with the same evil curse). Popular understanding of chain letters also abstracts away 
from the exact physical copying mechanism. Many chain letters contain explicit 
instructions to ‘copy’ the letter and send it to a certain number of people, but often 
do not specify the copying mechanism, nor the physical substrate to be used. Chain 
letter memes do not “care” about such trifles, as long as they make it to the next gen-
eration. They leave the choice of physical implementation to their willing executors.
In earlier days, people used pen and paper to copy chain letters.8 Later on, 
some mechanical procedures were developed to speed up the process, such as car-
bon paper and photocopiers, or the forward button on an e-mail service. Note that, 
strictly speaking, none of these mechanisms involve simple and straightforward cop-
ying, not even photocopiers. For one thing, all of those methods rely on a complex 
7 See www.arist ocrat sjoke s.com for a list of renditions and versions. The Wikipedia entry about “The 
Aristocrats” provides the abstract template of the joke (the “meme”), which consists only of three basic 
elements (Legman 2007). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this reference.
8 It has been argued that chain letters did not become truly epidemic until the invention of carbon paper. 
Memes ride piggyback on available technologies.
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intermediate step which involves heavy doses of Sperberian reconstruction: reading. 
In particular, the chain letter meme needs to wrestle its way into a human brain, so 
as to trigger the right dispositions in the reader and enlist him to the memetic cause, 
for example by exploiting his superstitious fears. Photocopy machines do not harbor 
superstitions, and cannot copy anything out of their own accord.
Now, how about the difference between evocation and extraction? Think about 
a medieval scribe copying a handwritten Latin manuscript of the Bible, before the 
invention of the printing press. In order to copy the manuscript, the scribe needs 
to possess plenty of prior knowledge, about the orthography of the roman alpha-
bet, and about Latin vocabulary, punctuation, and grammar. He wants to copy the 
manuscript, not the physical arrangement of ink on the parchment sheet down to 
the minutest splotch. Every time the scribe glances at the source manuscript, such 
prior knowledge is retrieved from his memory, and relied on to normalize errors and 
noise: misshaped letters, typos, crossed-out words. A scribe who has no knowledge 
of the Arabic script is not capable of producing a decent copy of an Arabic manu-
script, because he does not have the requisite knowledge to correct to the ortho-
graphical norm.9 At the lower (orthographical) level of manuscript copying, we see 
merely evocation. If we can talk about replication at all here—as I think we can—it 
is only at a higher level of abstraction. Each individual character and word is evoked 
from memory rather than transmitted, but the specific sequence of letters that  the 
scribe observes on the page constitutes novel information, and is being  extracted 
from the message. It was not already present wholesale in his mind.
Digitization and copying fidelity
Once we admit all of this for the case of chain letters, however, we will see that 
there is much more replication in the cultural realm than Sperber admits. Indeed, 
any transcription of a written text can be analyzed in the same way, because it is 
similarly based on prior knowledge of alphabet and vocabulary: evocation at a lower 
level, extraction (and thus replication) at a higher level. Most fundamentally, such 
faithful replication at a higher level of abstraction is possible because of the partial 
digitization of language, in the form of a written alphabet. By sharing a fixed reper-
toire of building blocks out of which more complex representations are constructed, 
human communicators can achieve a higher level of copying fidelity.10 Because 
they normalize at the level of the individual building blocks, and also because they 
use redundancy and repetition (Morin 2015), they achieve low levels of decay and 
distortion. But language does not provide the only such example of digitization. In 
his latest book, Dennett (2017) discusses digitization schemes for dance, musical 
9 The analogy between manuscript copying and DNA replication is so close that programs for analysing 
phylogenetic inference have now been used to uncover the relationships between medieval manuscripts 
(Howe et al. 2001).
10 More fundamentally, humans are capable of copying action sequences (imitation), rather than just end 
products (emulation) (Whiten et al. 2009; Mesoudi 2011, pp. 198–199).
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notation, weaving, and computer programming. An especially interesting case is ori-
gami folding, in which a student witnesses a folding demonstration by a teacher, 
and then carries out the action steps herself. Dawkins (1999) originally presented 
the example of origami folding as a solution to the problem of low copying fidel-
ity in a cultural environment. In his account, the instructions in origami are “self-
normalizing” (Dawkins 1999, p. xii), which prevents degeneration and distortion of 
the meme. Imperfections and small errors in the demonstration will be corrected by 
the pupil, and will not be preserved in the next generation. Sperber, for his part, has 
used the same example of origami folding to turn the table on Dawkins, and to show 
that cultural transmission generally does not involve replication. The student, Sper-
ber argues, is not trying to imitate each and every gesture of the teacher. Instead, she 
is reconstructing a set of instructions, by drawing inferences about plausible inten-
tions on the part of the instructor. In order to identify the steps in the sequence, the 
student is normalizing the behavior displayed by the teacher, parsing it into discrete 
steps (e.g. “fold the four corners into the middle of the page”).
Thus the normalisation of the instructions results precisely from the fact that 
something other than copying is taking place. It results from the fact that 
the information provided by the stimulus is complemented with information 
already available in the system. (Sperber 2000, p. 171)
All of this is certainly true, but it is not very different from the example of chain 
letters, which Sperber already admitted as an instance of memetic replication. In 
reality, both chain letters and origami folding involve significant amounts of evo-
cation of previously stored information, as well as extraction from the source. But 
these occur at different levels of resolution. At a lower level, what we see is mostly 
evocation. The student already possesses substantial knowledge about geometric fig-
ures, about the general philosophy of origami, and about the typical action steps 
out of which origami instructions are composed (fold/upper half/diagonal/turn over/
opposite corners). Those are the building blocks of origami folding, partially digi-
tized in the same way as the letters of the roman alphabet. Aided by inferences about 
goals and intentions, the student identifies the building blocks she is already familiar 
with, and ignores the noise and errors in the demonstration. For example, when the 
student observes something approximating a rectangle, she infers that the teacher 
intends to make a rectangle, and then retrieves this representation from memory, 
rather than copying the slightly skewed figure displayed by the instructor.
In the case of origami folding, lower-level knowledge about geometric figures and 
basic action sequences is merely evoked, not transmitted. Nevertheless, when we 
move up to a higher level of abstraction, we see that discrete pieces of information 
are being transmitted from the teacher to the pupil. If the teaching moment is to suc-
ceed, the specific sequence of steps must be exactly reproduced by the pupil. Now 
this sequence of steps, unlike underlying knowledge about triangles and folding 
lines, is not merely being evoked. It contains information that is novel and surpris-
ing to the pupil, and cannot be retrieved from memory. To be sure, as Sperber points 
out, there is no straightforward copying mechanism. But neither is there in the case 
of chain letters. In both cases, the information is being extracted from the stimulus 
on the basis of certain perceptual clues, in conjunction with background knowledge 
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about lower-level building blocks, and possibly also higher-order contextual knowl-
edge. In the case of the original joke about the mathematicians, by contrast, the 
information is being evoked wholesale, at the highest possible level of abstraction. 
There are no building blocks out of which the target representation is composed—or 
rather, there is only one building block, namely the entire joke. Naturally, Sperber 
is not suggesting that this is typical of real-life situations, and he admits that “in the 
cultural world, triggering and copying can and do combine in various degrees” (p. 
171). But this way of putting it remains vague, and suggests a situation of commu-
nicating vessels: the more triggering, the less copying, and vice versa. I propose to 
resolve the issue by distinguishing different levels of abstraction. In many cases of 
cultural transmission, evocation (at a lower level) enables extraction and replication 
(at a higher level). Both are present, but they do not combine in a simple zero-sum 
way.
Evocation and extraction
This analysis in terms of extraction versus evocation, on different levels of analysis, 
can be applied to a range of different cultural phenomena. Claidière et al. (2014, p. 
5) discuss the example of a student who, while taking down notes from the black-
board, is correcting the lecturer’s writing errors. This is not replication, according 
to these authors, because the student complements the information written on the 
blackboard with knowledge about the spelling of words that she already possesses. 
But even though the student already knows how to spell, she did not know the con-
tent of what the teacher is writing on the blackboard. In his own analysis of spelling 
errors, Dennett (2006a, b) has argued that normalization in cultural evolution can 
take place at different levels of semantic depth: on the level of orthography (from 
“sePERaTE” to “seperate”), spelling (from “sePERaTE” to “sePARaTE”) and at 
higher semantic levels (from “separate butt equal” to “separate but equal”). But 
the fact that humans correct “thinkos” on top of typos, as Dennett puts it, does not 
invalidate the replication model: it just makes it slightly more complicating (Dennett 
2006a, b, 2017, pp. 224–233).
As a final example, take a complex cultural representation in an oral tradition: 
a fairy tale. Acerbi and Mesoudi (2015) have analyzed the story of Cinderella at 
different levels of granularity. In an informal telling and retelling of the story, infor-
mation is only preserved at a highest level of abstraction, namely the basic outline 
of the plot: “a story involving a young lady, first oppressed by her stepmother and 
stepsisters, and then succeeding in marrying a prince” (Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015, 
p. 493). In order to extract this information from the stimuli provided by the teller, 
people already need to have knowledge of the building blocks of the story, both 
at a lower level of granularity (words and expressions), but also at an intermedi-
ate level of abstraction (the concepts of stepmother, prince, sibling rivalry, roman-
tic love). Cognitive psychologists have suggested that a proper appreciation of fairy 
tales depends on certain innate expectations about ontological categories (person, 
animal, inanimate object), which are triggered (evoked) in the minds of the listeners 
(Boyer 1994; Spelke 1994). In any event, whether the origin of evoked knowledge 
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is innate or cultural, it is not transmitted by the storyteller, but is already presup-
posed. In virtue of this prior knowledge, the listener will be able to fill in some gaps 
and reconstruct the story, gravitating in the directions of certain cultural attractors 
(Scott-Phillips 2015; Sperber 1996, 2012). But the narrative itself is not evoked, 
because usually the listener will never have heard the story before. At that level of 
granularity, the information is extracted from the stimuli. And we can model this as 
replication.
At this point, it is instructive to have a final look at DNA. It is often argued that 
we can only talk about proper “replication” in the biological domain because, unlike 
in the cultural domain, biological inheritance is accomplished by a single robust and 
specifiable mechanism, and also because genes have discrete boundaries (Claidière 
et al. 2014). But as Wilkins and Hull write about such critiques, “time and again an 
overly idealized view of Mendelian genetics is contrasted to a much more realistic 
view of [social-cultural-conceptual] change” (Wilkins and Hull 2001). In particu-
lar, many critics underestimate the complexity and messiness of DNA replication. 
During cell division, the double DNA strands are unzipped, and each strand serves 
as a template for the assembly of its complement. But biological reality is more 
complex. Not only does the replication machinery “normalize” at the level of the 
AGTC alphabet, but living cells also use a variety of complex DNA repair mecha-
nisms, which are constantly at work to correct occasional errors. Such correcting 
enzymes, as Dennett writes, normalize to semantic norms just like intelligent human 
beings, albeit “local or proximal semantic norms” (Dennett 2006a, b, p. 140). And 
the analogy extends further: there are mechanism for “proofreading” during DNA 
replication, analogous to how a student corrects errors on the blackboard. If there is 
a mutation in a single DNA strand, usually the repair mechanism excises the dam-
aged parts, and recompletes the strand by using the other strand as a template. In 
other words, genes use redundancy to minimize errors just like human beings do. 
In other types of repair, no template is needed, as the damage is “known” to occur 
only in one of the four bases. In the case of double strand breaks, there are different 
mechanisms for ligating the broken ends, with some mechanisms used as a preferred 
“first response”, while others only as a “last resort” in case of severe damage. Loss 
of the genes for proofreading results in hypermutation, and prevents high-fidelity 
transmission chains.
None is this is to deny that cultural replication, by and large, is a lot more messy 
and complicated than biology. But I think there is no qualitative difference. If we 
adopt an informational approach, we can abstract away from the nitty–gritty of both 
biological and cultural evolution. Heintz and Claidière, after presenting the Sper-
berian argument about the constructive nature of cultural evolution, argue that it is 
“not possible” to do an analysis of cultural phenomena “without peering into […] 
constructive cognitive processes.” (Heintz and Claidière 2015, p. 800) I think the 
current analysis shows that, for certain theoretical purposes, it is indeed safe to 
black-box the underlying constructive processes, as long as we have assured our-
selves that we are dealing with reconstruction rather than with wholesale evocation. 
Reconstructive processes do not rule out replication, or as Dennett writes: “You can 
finesse your ignorance of the gory mechanical details of how the information got 
from A to B, at least temporarily, and just concentrate on the implications of the fact 
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that some information did get there—and some other information didn’t” (Dennett 
1995, p. 359). If we adopt a purely abstract conception of cultural representations, 
we can see under what conditions the gory details of cultural transmission can be 
safely ignored, and when they cannot. My claim in this paper is that a process of 
information extraction can be safely black-boxed and treated as conceptually equiva-
lent to ‘replication’, provided of course that the information in the target represen-
tation instantiates the same information as in the source. By contrast, a process of 
wholesale evocation cannot be black-boxed, because the appearance of information 
being transmitted is illusory.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have defended an informational approach to biological and cultural 
evolution, on the basis of some thought experiments and intuition pumps. Genes 
should not be identified with the DNA molecule itself, but with the abstract infor-
mation of which the DNA molecule is the carrier. The fact that gene replication is 
achieved by a single identifiable molecule, with an alphabet of no more than four 
letters, is a coincidental fact about the efficiency of biological evolution, not a neces-
sary condition for replication to take place.
The informational approach is open-ended and flexible, as it does not require any 
specific physical substrate or specific mechanism for replication. To be sure, cul-
ture is much more messy than biology, but this need not pose a serious problem to 
the replication framework. Any physical object can act as a carrier of information, 
and ‘information’ can be identified at numerous levels of abstraction. However, we 
have to be careful about where the information is coming from. As Sperber and his 
colleagues have argued, just because we observe chains of re-occurring representa-
tions does not mean that some sort of replication is going on. On our informational 
approach, this makes sense: In a process of mere evocation, there is no reduction of 
uncertainty on the receiver’s end, because the information in question was already in 
place.
Pace Sperber and his colleagues, however, I have argued that heavy-handed 
reconstruction is not incompatible with a replication framework per se. But we 
have to distinguish between different levels of abstraction. Even though the build-
ing blocks of cultural representations are often merely evoked, their higher-level 
arrangement typically is not. The latter is a form of extraction, not evocation. I agree 
with Sperber that almost every form of cultural transmission involves an element 
of reconstruction on the basis of prior knowledge, but I part ways with him when 
it comes to the usefulness of the replication model. By distinguishing between dif-
ferent levels of abstraction and sticking to an informational conception of culture, I 
hope to have defused some resistance to talk of replication and memes.
This analysis in terms of evocation and extraction sheds some light on the mech-
anisms of cultural transmission, and hopefully provides more clarity about what 
exactly we are studying when we are studying evolving cultural traditions. But my 
discussion also serves more distant explanatory goals. In particular, if we want to 
understand the evolution of complex cultural adaptations (Henrich 2015; Mesoudi 
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et al. 2006), we need to be able to track cultural items as they accumulate, combine, 
branch out, and form different cultural traditions. In order to do so, we need to grant 
cultural items a relative measure of autonomy (Boudry et al. 2015; Boudry and Hof-
huis 2018; Dennett 2017; Norenzayan 2013). If cultural transmission is too close to 
the ‘evoked’ end of the spectrum, however, all of this becomes hard to make sense 
of. On the one hand, the facts of human history show that cultural information is 
preserved, transmitted, and eventually accumulated across generations. On the other 
hand, Sperber and his colleagues may well be right that humans do not have a spe-
cial talent for simple imitation,11 and that cultural transmission is always a highly 
reconstructive affair. I hope to have shown that these two perspectives can be recon-
ciled. Reconstruction does not rule out replication.
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